Abstract. Transaction privacy is a hard problem on an account-based blockchain such as Ethereum. While Ben-Sasson et al. presented the Zerocash protocol [BCG + 14] as a decentralized anonymous payment (DAP) scheme standing on top of Bitcoin, no study about the integration of such DAP on top of a ledger defined in the account model was provided. In this paper we aim to fill this gap and propose ZETH, an adaptation of Zerocash that can be deployed on top of Ethereum without making any change to the base layer. Our study shows that not only ZETH could be used to transfer Ether, the base currency of Ethereum, but it could also be used to transfer other types of smart contract-based digital assets. We propose an analysis of ZETH's privacy promises and argue that information leakages intrinsic to the use of this protocol are controlled and well-defined, which makes it a viable solution to support private transactions in the context of public and permissioned chains.
Introduction
The two cryptocurrencies with the biggest market capitalization are Bitcoin [Nak09] and Ethereum [But14] . One of the crucial differences between them is the way they store information. While Bitcoin relies on the UTXO model, which stores the list of all unspent transaction outputs, Ethereum is account based, that is, it keeps track of accounts' balances. Although neither currencies provide strong privacy properties to their users, Zerocash [BCG + 14] practically solved this issue on Bitcoin-like systems. Unfortunately, integrating Zerocash on Ethereum is not described in the paper and does not seem to be feasible out of the box.
In this paper we present ZETH -a variation of Zerocash that allows for secure and private payments on Ethereum. We claim that ZETH can easily be used with any ERC20, or ERC223 token 1 , and can be used along any Ethereum client. Moreover, ZETH uses minimal trust assumptions and no asymmetry is introduced in the system, namely, no trusted or special node or role is required to satisfy our privacy promises. Finally, we provide a proof of concept implementation of ZETH 2 .
Privacy limitations of Ethereum
The Ethereum protocol provides an extension to Bitcoin by enabling execution of arbitrary computation on-chain on the so-called Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM), which is Turing complete. Ethereum can be seen as a distributed state machine, where every transaction triggers a state transition. These transitions modify the underlying state that keeps track of the account balances and contracts' storage. As a consequence, every transaction done from an account is publicly recorded on the blockchain and modifies the public state.
Using smart contracts as a way to provide privacy preserving state transitions appears to be an appealing idea. Unfortunately, such solutions are not perfect and come with several drawback due to the gas model that was introduced to bound the computation of each state transition and keep the system running.
In the gas model each operation executed on the EVM uses a number of gas units and the minimal gas cost of a transaction is 21 000 gas. An Ethereum user who wants to run a smart contract function has to specify the amount of gas units to be used for the function execution, along with the price in Wei 3 they are willing to pay per gas unit (gas price). These two values are used to determine the maximum cost of the transaction the sender is willing to pay. Denote this upper bound by u Wei. When the transaction is submitted to the system and gets processed, u Wei are secured at the user's account. The effective gas usage of the transaction, denoted e Wei, is computed as the transaction is executed. The unused gas, namely u − e Wei, is returned to the sender. If the execution of a smart contract function runs out of gas 4 , the modifications to the state carried out during the execution of this function are reverted, the miner 5 collects a fee corresponding to the gas used and the transaction sender does not get any Wei back.
Crucially, enforcing the payment of gas for every transaction processed on Ethereum prevents malicious users from saturating the network with dummy transactions and restrain adversaries from deploying smart contracts representing never-ending state transitions, e.g. infinite loops.
Since paying for transaction fees directly alters Ethereum accounts, and thus modifies the public state, everybody can tell the nature of a transaction, what data it carries and how much gas was paid by the transaction sender. As a consequence, having a smart contract-based private payment solution still requires users to interact with the contract and pay for its execution. This translates in information leakage and can disclose a potential relation between the users interacting with the contract.
Furthermore, implementing a smart contract-based privacy payment solution can be quite expensive. In fact, since users need to pay for the execution of the contract, any expensive on-chain computation leads to high amount of gas to be 3 Wei is the base unit (or smallest denomination) of Ether. 4 The amount of gas required to execute the function is higher than the amount of gas paid by the user. 5 Node that reaches consensus over the Ethereum state and that produces blocks by executing a set of transactions submitted by network users.
paid by the smart contracts callers. The expensiveness of privacy on Ethereum has already been pointed out by the community [Rob18], and should hopefully improve in the following releases of the platform. Finally, the gas model inherent to Ethereum implies that several privacy enhancing techniques, initially described in the context of Bitcoin, cannot be applied to Ethereum (at least on a Byzantium fork). One of such concept is the notion of stealth addresses [Tod14] . Using the stealth addresses mechanism to generate new identities on the network cannot be used on Ethereum because of the need to pay gas for every transaction. That is, if a user tries to send a transaction from a stealth address, the transaction will be considered invalid, because the balance associated with the address is 0. Consequently, no transactions can be initiated from it. A naive solution to this issue would be to fund the stealth address from another, potentially publicly known, address. Unfortunately, such action may introduce a link between the funded address and the newly generated stealth address 6 .
ZETH protocol
ZETH implements a private payment mechanism by running a mixing smart contract on which members of the Ethereum network willing to transact privately deposit their funds in exchange for zethNotes. The notes are stored on the mixer as commitments and can be privately transferred among users of the network. Importantly, once the funds enter the mixer it is not necessary to withdraw them since zethNotes can be used for future payments within the smart contract. This property essentially increases the security and privacy of the proposed solution. Intuitively, the longer the funds are circulating in the mixer, the harder it is to connect them with their previous owners. In order to provide the same security guarantees as UTXO systems operating on public data and keep the system sound (funds are bound to an owner and cannot be double spent), ZETH follows the construction detailed in Zerocash. First of all, the notes themselves are not transferred between the parties. Rather, destruction of some N notes belonging to the sender allows for creation of other M notes possessed and controlled by the recipient.
Secondly, with an overwhelming probability, each note has a distinct and pseudorandom serial number sn (also called nullifier ). When the note is spent (destroyed), its fixed serial number is revealed on the network to ensure that this note will not be spent a second time. Moreover, the pseudorandomness of this number assures that it is infeasible to connect previously published commitments with the spent notes.
Thirdly, the creation of new notes comes with the publication of a list of commitments that hide all new notes' attributes, e.g. the value, public key of the recipient, and nonces , r. Encryption of these attributes is broadcast. The ciphertexts are encrypted using the recipients' encryption keys, such that they can easily learn hidden attributes necessary to later spend the notes.
Last but not least, correctness of these operations is provided by a succinct zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (cf. Section 2.3), which assures that the sender is the rightful owner of the notes, the commitments to the spent notes were previously published, and the transaction is balanced, i.e. the value of notes input to the transaction equals the value output. We note here that some inputs and outputs may be public. An overview of the protocol is provided in Section 3 and more formal definitions of its security is shown in Appendix B. Importantly, since the proof verification procedure is deterministic it can be executed on-chain. 
Security of ZETH
Since each call to the mixer contract leaks the caller who pays the gas for the smart contract function execution, the list of users of the system is public. That is, each transfer is accompanied by a modification of the Ethereum state. Especially, the balance of the caller in decremented by the gas cost of the transaction. On the other hand, the recipient is fully hidden even when they want to use the funds by passing them on (i.e. when the recipient effectively becomes the sender) or withdrawing them from the mixer, cf. Fig. 1 . While calling the mixer contract reveals that a party has funds to transfer and can expose the fact that they were recipient of a payment in the past; it is not possible to determine the payment they received. Thus, despite the lack of obfuscation of users, we claim that ZETH is an appropriate solution to blur the transaction graph, and thus, hide relationships between senders and recipients, transactions' value, along with the wealth of each user of the mixing service.
To make a payment, the sender calls the contract by executing the Mix function of the mixer smart contract and publishes the serial numbers of the input zethNotes, the ciphertexts of the new notes, and the transaction's zero-knowledge proof of knowledge. The encrypted zethNotes are integrated as a part of the logs of the transaction and the state of the smart contract is changed since new commitments are appended and serial numbers are revealed.
We leverage the ability to emit events in a smart contract to implement an encrypted broadcast used to make sure that the sender and the recipient never need to communicate. In addition to that, we build on the fact that state transitions corresponding to mixer contract calls do not reveal the same amount of information as state transitions triggered by plain Ethereum transactions. In fact, the state transition encoded by the mixer's function results in the modification of the smart contract state (commitments and serial numbers are appended) along with some gas being paid by the smart contract caller. Nonetheless, plain Ethereum transactions (e.g. Alice pays 2 ETH to Bob) modify the public state which leaks the relationship of the sender and recipient along with the value of the payment.
In that sense, the use of ZETH changes the topology of the transaction graph. More precisely, let the graph's nodes represent Ethereum accounts and its (directed) edges correspond to transactions and messages between them. As shown in Fig. 2a , each pair of transacting nodes are easy to identify. However, when transactions go through ZETH, the mixer smart contract serves as an intermediary. Thus, instead of account-to-account edges, the graph is now made of account-to-mixer or mixer-to-all-accounts (encrypted broadcast) edges that obfuscate the relationship between users of the system, see From the security point of view, it is important to notice that ZETH, using techniques introduced by Zerocash, allows for an arbitrary denomination of notes. Although some solutions aim to provide private transactions of standard/predefined denominations, adding such a constraint has several drawbacks that can take users away from the recommended behaviors (see Section 4), or even render the entire system unusable. Furthermore, previous work [Ron18] have shown that smart contract-based solutions using predefined denominations could eventually lead to several exploitable data leakages that could, in fine, undermine the privacy of its users.
Divergence from Zerocash
As mentioned, Zerocash has initially been designed to work as a fork of the Bitcoin blockchain. Since Ethereum and Bitcoin differ on many aspects, we needed to modify the Zerocash protocol in order to reflect the diversions of these two blockchains.
While most of our construction is based on the protocol described in the Zerocash paper [BCG + 14], our protocol presents weaker privacy guarantees than the original design. In fact, users of the ZETH mixing service are not obfuscated.
Furthermore, we decided to leverage smart contract events as a way to implement an encrypted broadcast mechanism to exchange the zethNotes between users of the system. This ability, natively supported by Ethereum, is used to provide an additional layer of privacy for the system users.
Finally, we decided to implement a single function on the mixer smart contract, that supports both minting and pouring coins. This comes with the drawback of requiring a zero-knowledge proof when one makes a deposit into the mixer (and mint zethNotes), but also comes with the benefit of a more flexible mixer and a better obfuscation of funds.
Related work
Before we present our contribution to privacy on Ethereum, it is worth mentioning related works presented in the past. A first step integration of Zerocash and Ethereum was made in 2016 as a joint effort between members of Zcash, Ethereum Foundation and Cornell University. The resulting code of this project called babyZoE is available on Github 7 . Later, barryWhiteHat proposed a project Miximus 8 that was used as a starting point for the first version of our proof of concept before adapting Zcash Sprout for the second version of the PoC. Finally, a draft study of the integration of Zerocash on Ethereum has already been written and published on Github 9 a few months ago. This paper formalizes, improves and presents an implementation of this initial work. Likewise, a new design for anonymous cryptocurrencies called Quisquis [FMMO18] has been proposed. This solution relies on the notion of updatable public keys, and keeps track of users' wealth using an account structure. The balance of a given account is kept in an obfuscated, committed form and can be updated using the homomorphic property of the commitment scheme. Being account based, Quisquis presents some advantages regarding scalability. Nevertheless, the potentially (very) long list of a user's updated keys may present a challenge in term of key management and several issues regarding transactions asynchrony are still to be solved.
More recently, the AZTEC protocol was published [Wil18] . This efficient privacy enhancing protocol seating on top of Ethereum uses a form of special purpose zero-knowledge proofs leveraging Boneh-Boyen signatures to create a commitment scheme equipped with efficient range proofs. While AZTEC does not rely on any zkSNARK, it also comes with the drawback of requiring a trusted setup, which is expected to be carried out via a multiparty computation ceremony.
Last but not least, Bünz et al. proposed Zether [BAZB19], a private payment mechanism atop of Ethereum. Similarly to Quisquis, Zether is account-based, what could potentially ease the interaction with other Ethereum-based smart contracts. In support of this claim, the authors show several applications of their mechanism like sealed-bid auctions, payment channels, stake voting and privacypreserving proofs of stake. Nevertheless, the design of Zether comes with some drawbacks, one of them being the cost of a transaction. Furthermore, the size of a zero-knowledge proof π in a Zether transfer depends on the size of the anonymity set, which is preferably as big as possible. Also, since the statement for π depends on the sender's account balance, the account has to be locked to make sure the proof is acceptable.
Preliminaries

Notations
Let PPT denote probabilistic polynomial time and let NUPPT denote nonuniform PPT. Let λ ∈ N be the security parameter, in practice we set e.g. λ = 128. All adversaries are stateful. An adversary and all parties they control are denoted by letter A. We write negl or poly to denote a negligible or polynomial function resp. We say that the adversary wins game GAME if they make GAME return 1. We say that A wins GAME with negligible advantage if Adv game A,GAME (λ) = 2 |Pr[GAME = 1] − 1/2| ≤ negl(λ). In this paper we follow the conventions of [BCG + 14] and use sha256 as a hash function inside the Merkle tree, as a commitment scheme, and as a pseudorandom function.
Cryptographic primitives
Collision resistant hash function family. Informally speaking, a collision resistant hash function family H is a collection of functions such that no PPT algorithm given random h ∈ H can find x and x , such that h(x) = h(x ) and x = x with non-negligible probability. In the real world it is usually assumed that the hash function family consists of a single function, e.g. sha256. For a formal definition see, e.g., [Gol01].
Key-private and CCA2-secure encryption scheme. An encryption scheme E consists of the following three algorithms:
given a security parameter as input returns a public key pk and a secret key sk; Enc pk (m, r): on input m outputs c, a ciphertext that encrypts plaintext m under public key pk and randomness r; Dec sk (c): given ciphertext c and secret key sk returns plaintext m such that for any r holds Dec sk (Enc pk (m, r)) = m.
As usually, we require that the encryption scheme is ciphertext-indistinguishable (IND-CCA2). That is, for any NUPPT adversary A and sufficiently large λ
for the IND-CCA2 game defined at Fig. 3a . In this game the adversary A is equipped with oracle access to an oracle O that encrypts messages and decrypts ciphertexts submitted by A. Finally, the adversary provides two messages m 0 and m 1 and in response gets one of them (picked at random) encrypted in a ciphertext c. A wins the game if they guess whether c hides m 0 or m 1 . Importantly, A can query O even after they learned c. However, the oracle answers ⊥ if queried on the challenge ciphertext c.
In addition to be IND-CCA2-secure, we also require E to be key-private. Roughly speaking, E is called key-private [BBDP01] if it hides the public key that was used to generate the ciphertext. Formally we require that for any NUPPT adversary A and sufficiently large λ
for the IK-CCA game defined at Fig. 3b . In this game the adversary A gets access to two encryption-decryption oracles each of them parameterized with a different pair of keys, either (pk 0 , sk 0 ) or (pk 1 , sk 1 ). Similarly to the IND-CCA2 game, the adversary provides message m and in response gets its encryption c under key pk 0 or pk 1 . A wins the game if they guess whether c was encrypted using pk 0 or pk 1 . Importantly, A can query their oracles even after they learned c. However, the oracles answer ⊥ if queried on the challenge ciphertext c.
IND-CCA2
Key-private encryption scheme.
Fig. 3:
We require that the encryption scheme we use is both IND-CCA2 and IK-CCA-secure. That is, for any NUPPT adversary A, the probability that A has non-negligible advantage in one of the games is negligible.
Pseudorandom function family. Informally speaking, a pseudorandom function family {PRF k : A → B} k∈K is a collection of functions such that for randomly chosen k ∈ K, function PRF k is indistinguishable from a random function that maps A to B. For a formal definition see, e.g., [Gol01].
Commitment schemes. A commitment scheme Γ is the compound of two algorithms (Com, Vf) such that:
Com r (m): given message m and randomness r, returns commitment c; Vf(c, m, r): given commitment c, message m and randomness r, checks whether c = Com r (m) and accepts iff that is the case.
We say that Γ is statistically binding if no adversary A, even computationally unbounded, can produce commitment c and two openings (m, r), (m , r ), such that c = Com r (m) = Com r (m ). Also, Γ is computationally hiding if for every m, m , the probability distributions of Com r (m) and Com r (m ) are computationally indistinguishable over the choice of randomness r, r .
Brief overview of zkSNARKs
Let R be a relation generator, such that R(1 λ ) returns a polynomial-time decidable binary relation R = {(x, w)}. Here, x is the instance and w is the witness. We assume that λ is explicitly deductible from the description of R. Let L be an NP language corresponding to the relation R. Roughly speaking, Ψ is a publicly verifiable zero-knowledge Succint Non-interactive Argument of Knowledge (zkSNARK) for L if Ψ comports four PPT algorithms KGen, P, V, Sim such that:
CRS generator: KGen is a PPT algorithm that takes security parameter λ (presented in unary) as input, runs a one time setup routine, and outputs a common reference string (CRS) crs along with a trapdoor td. The part of crs used for proving statements is sometimes called proving key and denoted crs P , and the part necessary for their verification is called verification key and denoted crs V . Prover: P is a PPT algorithm that given (crs, x, w), such that (x, w) ∈ R, outputs an argument π. Verifier: V is a PPT algorithm that on input (crs, x, π) returns either 0 (reject) or 1 (accept). Simulator: Sim is a PPT algorithm that on input (crs, td, x) outputs an argument π.
We require a proof system Ψ to have the following four properties (see, e.g., [GM17] for their formal definition):
Completeness: Ψ is complete if an honest verifier accepts a proof made by an honest prover. That is, the verifier accepts a proof made for (x, w) ∈ R. Knowledge soundness: Ψ is knowledge-sound if from an acceptable proof π for instance x it is feasible for a specialized algorithm called extractor to extract a witness w such that (x, w) ∈ R. (Note, knowledge soundness implies soundness.) Zero knowledge: Ψ is zero-knowledge if for any x ∈ L no adversary can distinguish a proof made by an honest prover equipped with (crs, x, w) from a proof made by the simulator equipped with (crs, td, x) but no witness w. Succinctness: Ψ is succinct if the proof π is sub-linear to the size of the instance and witness 11 .
We note that zkSNARKs described in [GM17, BG18] present an additional security property that could be desirable, i.e.
Simulation extractability: Ψ is simulation-extractable if from any proof π for instance x output by an adversary with access to an oracle producing simulated proof on given inputs, it is possible for an extractor to extract a witness w, such that (x, w) ∈ R.
Obviously, simulation extractability is a stronger property than knowledge soundness. This property is crucial for securing transaction non-malleability (cf. Appendix B.2).
Trusted setup and CRS
As previously stated, zkSNARKs come with the need to generate a common reference string for the proofs to be computed and verified [GO94] . In the literature it is usually assumed that the CRS comes from a trusted third party that provides the string and effectively disappears (does not take any part in the following computations). While a trusted party could be named to run the setup, such trust assumption is sometimes unacceptable, especially in the context of public blockchains. Furthermore, if the CRS was produced maliciously it may compromise the privacy and security of the system breaking zero knowledge and soundness properties [CGGN17] .
Such issues raised a special attention around the use of multi-party computation (MPC) ceremonies where a set of users run a sophisticated cryptographic protocol to generate the CRS together. In that setting, the soundness and zeroknowledge of the system is ensured if at least one participant of the ceremony is honest [BCG + 15,Bow18,BGG17]. More recently, Abdolmaleki et al.
[ABLZ17] and Fuchsbauer [Fuc18] shown how to achieve zero-knowledge if no party in the MPC protocol is honest.
Recently, Groth et al. [GKM
+ 18] and Maller et al. [MBKM19] proposed a novel approach for the CRS generation for zkSNARKs that allows to produce a single master CRS crs mstr for all circuits of given size that can be later securely specialized into another CRS crs spec for a particular Quadratic Arithmetic Program (QAP). In other words, the techniques developed by Groth et al., and Maller et al. allow to reduce the trust required in the trusted setup. Now, one only needs to trust that the master CRS was created honestly, what yields security for all possible crs spec . In our case, one could imagine that we would have a single crs mstr for all possible mixers and zkSNARK-based protocols, such that each of them use different crs spec and the security of each of the mixers relies on the generation of the master CRS.
We note that any kind of non-interactive zero knowledge is impossible in the so-called standard model and requires some additional assumptions. As an alternative to the common reference string model [CF01] one could use the random oracle model [BR93] , as, e.g., in [BBB + 18,BCS16], and transform any constantround interactive protocol into a non-interactive one using Fiat-Shamir transformation FS [FS86, PS96] . However, it is important to note that no efficiently computable function can instantiate the random oracle [CGH98,Nie02], the security proof for FS in [PS96] works for constant-round protocols only, and it is not certain when the transformation is secure if the random oracle is substituted by a concrete function.
Overview of the protocol
The following section dives into the specifics of the ZETH protocol. ZETH takes its roots in the Zerocash protocol [BCG + 14], but comes with several modifications to work on Ethereum. Here, we introduce our protocol and give a short example of a possible use case. In the considered scenario we focus on two parties Alice A and Bob B. The parties join ZETH and Alice deposits her money into the mixer and makes a secure and private payment to some parties, one of which is Bob. A variable var attributed to a party P is written as P.var or simply var, if P is clear from the context. For the sake of simplicity we assume that each party uses only one of their Ethereum accounts in the mixer.
ZETH setup
In order to make a payment via ZETH, several smart contracts need to be deployed on-chain first.
Addr: (optional) The address registry contract stores the public tuple of the zethAddresses, i.e. encryption keys and public key used to create notes, of all peers. Mxr: The mixer contract handles deposits of funds, private transfers and withdrawals. The contract contains and keeps track of a Merkle tree of commitments (via MTree), the serial numbers, and calls Vrf (instantiated with the CRS generated from the setup) to verify the provided proof during a private transfer of digital assets. MTree: The Merkle tree contract implements a Merkle tree using sha256 as a hash function. The Merkle tree is initialized with zero values at its leaves and is full, i.e., for a tree of depth d it contains 2 d+1 − 1 nodes. Vrf: The verifier contracts contains the CRS generated by the setup and is in charge of verifying proofs provided by payment senders.
The security of ZETH relies on the security of the zkSNARK proof system Ψ, which has to be provided with a CRS. As mentioned in Section 2.3.1, we propose to use multi-party computation to generate the CRS using e.g. [BCG + 15,BGG17]. The CRS of the zkSNARK has to be available for various parties of the protocol. More precisely, the sender of the payment plays the role of a prover P and needs the CRS to make an acceptable proof π. The proof is checked by a smart contract Vrf, which runs the Ψ's verifier routine V, thus it has to be provided with the CRS as well. We emphasize here that the CRS needs to be generated only once for the whole lifespan of the mixer.
Joining the mixer
To join ZETH each party P starts with generating their zethAddresses which are tuples of the form P.addr := (P.addr pk , P.addr sk ) .
An address P.addr • consists of P.a • and P.k • , where P.a pk is a public address derived from a private P.a sk , P.k pk is a public encryption key, and P.k sk is a private decryption key. The key pair (P.k pk , P.k sk ) is used to enable the peers to send each other data privately. After generating a zethAddress, each party publishes the public tuple P.addr pk in Addr in order to be able to receive payments from other counterparts. Note, this step is not absolutely necessary and, if done, should be done only once for each new joiner. It is also feasible for the parties to send each other their public addresses addr pk using some other channel of communication (off-chain). However, if P wants to transact with, say, N other members of the network they need to send N off-chain messages to inform all of them of their address P.addr pk . Such a workaround could impede the use of ZETH.
Mix function
The core of the mixer consists of a Mix function, which provides a method for secure and private payments between the parties. Mix covers the main functionalities of Mxr, and provides a unique interface to:
1. make a deposit of public funds to the mixer (and mint zethNotes), 2. proceed with payments between users via the use of Mxr, 3. withdraw funds from Mxr (redeem public funds).
These three functionalities imply a natural division of Mix's inputs: -The value v in which specifies the public value that should be added to the mix. This input is essential for the deposit functionality. -The value v out which specifies the public value that should be sent back to the caller. This input is essential for the withdrawal functionality. -And finally, a set of inputs used to represent transfer of funds in Mxr, which contains:
to the newly generated zethNotes {z
, • a zero-knowledge proof π that assures that 1. the transaction is balanced, i.e. the sum of the transaction inputs equals the sum of transaction outputs; 2. if the creation of z new requires spending some old zethNotes z old , which commitments are stored in a Merkle tree of root rt, then the user has the right to do so;
• the serial numbers of the spent notes {z
, to ensure double-spending prevention;
• the encryption of the newly created zethNotes, i.e. ciphertexts
; these ciphertexts are crucial for the recipient of the transfer to be able to spend the notes.
Obviously, privacy of deposits and withdrawals is limited since some pieces of information are inevitably revealed as the public balances of the depositor and withdrawer are modified along with Mxr's balance. We also note here that the parties cannot transfer all of their funds to the mixer since they need their external accounts to pay for the gas necessary to perform ZETH operations. Nevertheless, no one can tell how the deposited value is spread across the newly created zethNotes. On the other hand, privacy guarantees in Mxr payments are strong -nobody can tell which z old -s were spent, what is the value of newly created z new -s, and who is their recipient.
Payments explained practically
Here we provide an illustrative example of how Mix works. Now that payer Alice and recipient Bob have generated their zethAddresses (and advertised their public keys), they can start making payments. As mentioned, we allow Alice to specify up to M recipients R 1 , . . . , R M . Assume Alice wants to pay R i value v ARi . Note that one or all of these parties could be Alice herself and all the zethNotes can be zero-valued. Furthermore, commitments of zero-valued zethNotes are indistinguishable from the rest, cf. Section 3.4.1. One should not be able to tell whether she paid M people M different amounts, or if she paid p people (p < M ) and took back some change, or just whether she split her funds to herself.
As mentioned, Alice can use two types of funds: her public funds and the funds she controls on the Mxr contract, i.e. zethNotes z A . Each of them may be used to create new committed notes cm new 1 , . . . , cm new M that will be appended to the Merkle tree of Mxr. The commitments cm old 1 , . . . , cm old N already contained in MTree which Alice controls and decides to use in the transaction are called spent commitments. The notion of spent commitment is technically imprecise, but we use it to ease the understanding of the protocol. In fact, the set of commitments is an ever-growing list, and no one should be able to distinguish between commitments corresponding to notes that have already been used in payments (i.e. spent commitments), and commitments which associated notes have never been used. Only the user knowing the opening of the commitment can tell whether a commitment was spent or not.
Furthermore, Alice generates a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge π that assures she knows the private input a 
constitute the data of a mix transaction tx Mix . We describe below, the steps Alice needs to follow in order to transact via Mxr.
Commitment creation
Alice creates M commitments cm 
With the commitments created, Alice proceeds to the next step.
Preparation of ciphertexts
Zeth notes z are defined as openings of the commitments cm. More precisely, for a commitment cm new i , we define
and denote by c i the encryption of the note, c i = Enc Ri.k pk (z i ). Note that, if Alice wants to transfer some notes back to her (e.g. as a change), she encrypts these notes using her own encryption key A.k pk . Since the encryption scheme is key-private, no one can tell which key was used to encrypt the message. Thus, it effectively hides the recipient. Moreover, the ability of the Mxr contract to broadcast M ciphertexts in a single smart contract call enables Alice to pay up to M recipients in the same transaction and paves the way for more complex payment schemes.
Zero-knowledge proof generation
Since commitments cm new i may be associated to some value and spent in the future, Alice needs to provide a proof that these commitments are well-formed and that she had enough funds to create the associated notes. To that end, Alice picks her N commitments cm 
where v in , v out are the public input value and public output value resp, and where z i .v denotes the value of the note z i .
In the rest of this paper, we denote by R z the NP-relation that consists of all pairs of primary input x and auxiliary input w that satisfy the constraints above. Note, that the statement as presented is adapted from Zcash Sprout [HBHW19], and is a bit different than the one in the original Zerocash paper. However, the computation of sn and cm follows closely the construct detailed in [BCG + 14], which asks for some additional security mechanisms around the choice and the use of ρ and r to avoid the creation of malicious notes that cannot be spent 13 . Last but not least, the above-mentioned statement does not contain components that were added in [BCG + 14] to provide non-malleability of the zero-knowledge proof. To achieve this property we propose to either use a nonmalleable zkSNARK like [GM17, BG18] , or add the additional elements as specified in [BCG + 14] and in the Zcash code base.
Mix function call
After generating the commitments {cm
, computing the serial numbers {sn
and the proof π, and encrypting the notes
) .
12 The equality check between two bit strings b1 and b2 can be carried out by a succession of constraints in the form e · (b1 -the given Merkle root rt is valid (i.e. corresponds to one of the roots that has fingerprinted the Merkle tree of commitments maintained by the smart contract), -none of the serial numbers sn ∈ {sn
is in the list of serial numbers that have already been used, -the zkSNARK verifier Ψ.V accepts the proof π, -the sender's balance is at least v in .
In that case, Mxr appends {sn
to the list of serial numbers, adds {cm
as leaves to MTree; and broadcasts
. Otherwise, it rejects. One should note that it is not possible to link the commitments in the Merkle tree with their associated publicly disclosed serial numbers. This holds since, the serial numbers are derived from private data only known by the owner of the notes associated with the commitments. This also ensures that a user appending a commitment in the tree, as part of a payment to another user, does not know the serial number in advance and thus, cannot tell when the recipient spends the received funds. Moreover, given a note z, its associated commitment cm and the given serial number sn, it is intractable to compute a new serial number for z different from sn. Thus, disclosing the serial numbers publicly allows parties to detect and reject attempts of double spending of the same note.
Payment reception
Assume v AB is a value that Alice agrees to sent Bob. To carry out such payment she computes all necessary inputs to the Mix function and executes it. Although no more is required from Alice, Bob cannot just accept that Mix function was executed properly to recognize she fulfilled her obligations. For example, cheating Alice could transfer less money than v AB . Since the Mxr contract does not have access to the value Alice and Bob agreed to exchange, it only checks constraints to ensure that the system remains sounds, and thus, do not compare Alice's committed value v with v AB . To make sure that the payment was done as supposed, Bob has to perform some additional actions.
First of all, Bob needs to fetch the transferred notes. To that end he observes the events emitted by Alice's call to the smart contract and tries to decrypt all broadcast ciphertexts using his decryption key B.k sk . Say that among the M ciphertexts M decryptions were successful, resulting in a set of new zethNotes {z j } M j=1 owned and controlled by Bob. (Note that Bob does not need to know M in advance.) This operation is done by calling a function Receive that scans Mxr's events and tries to decrypt all ciphertexts that was posted after Bob's last call to the function. Every successful event decryption provides Bob with a new note that is then stored in his wallet.
However, even though Bob received the notes, he needs to check that he can use them and that their values sum up to v AB . To that end, Bob recomputes all commitments { cm and accepts the payment if they all hold. Now Bob can follow the same steps Alice did to use the notes he received and pass them on.
Abuse mitigation and best practices
It is important to note that even the best private payment system cannot provide much privacy if its users, who are supposed to be protected and anonymous, do not follow some best practices, misuse the system, or do not know its limitations. Even Zcash users' anonymity can be breached if they behave improperly [KYMM18] . Section 3 and Appendix B give an overview of how the ZETH protocol works and the security model it follows. This section presents potential ways to exploit the system to infer valuable information about the ongoing payments showing the limits of the security model we use and presents a few best practices to mitigate attack vectors as much as possible.
Keep the funds in the mixer as long as possible. As explained in Section 1.2, the state maintained by the Ethereum blockchain leaks some information about users of the system. As a consequence, the longer users make payments via the mixer, without transfers from/to Ethereum accounts, the better. This leaks less data to passive attackers who monitor the account balances of users of the mixing service.
Beware of almost empty MTree. As one might have noticed in Section 3, if the Merkle tree of commitments MTree is almost empty when Alice and Bob want to make a secure payment, then their privacy is at risk as they could be identified as the sender and recipient of the payment. Assume a scenario when there is almost no commitments in MTree, then some funds are added by Alice and some funds are withdrawn by Bob. In some circumstances, an adversary who observes the contract can guess that Alice made payment to Bob and the payment was at least of value withdrawn by the latter. Thus, it is important to avoid withdrawals until the number of non-zero leaves (commitments appended) of MTree is of reasonable size.
On the other hand, a large MTree cannot be considered absolutely safe. Since the adversary can easily add many MTree entries by doing transactions between accounts controlled by themselves, Alice may be tricked to think MTree is big enough, while in fact all entries but Alice's are controlled by a single eavesdropping party.
Small user anonymity set. Similar situation occurs when there is very few active parties using the Mxr contract. If Alice and Bob are the only parties using Mxr, then an observant adversary can assume that each payment made by Alice has Bob as a recipient. Furthermore, if Bob withdraws funds from the contract despite he has not made any deposit, the adversary could conclude that the funds were transferred by Alice.
We suppose here that we have a public registry of users of the Mxr contract (as e.g. Addr). It is important to understand that even though a large set of users of Mxr often comes with the belief of stronger privacy guarantees this is not always the case. In fact, similarly to the case of a small set of commitments in MTree, an adversary could easily register a lot of parties in the Addr contract by paying only a small fee. In that case, Alice could have the impression that the registry contains a lot of entries, while almost all of them are controlled by a single entity, leading to a system with insufficient privacy guarantees [Dou02] 14 .
Split funds in the mixer. It is a good practice for users to make payments to themselves to spread their wealth across a set of commitments and obfuscate their balance. Note that these payments may be dummy payments of value 0, which are indistinguishable from non-zero payments and introduce the necessary noise in the system. However, such operations come at the cost of paying for gas for the execution of the Mix function.
Use the most recent Merkle root to enhance the mixing. As the set of all commitments is stored in a Merkle tree, it is fingerprinted by the tree's root. Hence, whenever a new commitment is appended as a leaf of the tree, the value of the root changes. Importantly, if a user uses an older version of the Merkle tree to spend their funds, the associated proof is still valid. However, such behaviour is not advised. As the tree is ever-growing, the number of non-empty leaves at time t 0 , denoted by n t0 , is smaller or equal to this number at time t 1 , denoted by n t1 , for t 0 < t 1 . Assume a transfer is made at time t 1 using the root of the tree from t 0 . Then, even though the tree contains n t1 leaves an adversary can tell that the commitments used in the transaction are among those that were appended to the tree before t 0 what limits anonymity.
If decryption of zeth notes fails. Assume that Alice and Bob have a contractual agreement and that Alice owes k ETH to Bob in exchange for some goods. Note that when Alice transfers funds to Bob she is supposed to encrypt a number of zethNotes of agreed values using Bob's encryption key. Moreover, Bob can pass the funds on only if he decrypts them. If Alice wishes to trick Bob, she could decide to encrypt her zethNote using her own encryption key. That way, instead of making a payment to Bob, she makes a payment to herself and waits for Bob to send her goods. Nevertheless, this issue could be solved by requiring Bob to withhold sending Alice's goods until he manages to decrypt the notes that match with the expected value for the goods 15 . Unfortunately, now Bob can behave maliciously and accept the payment without sending the goods. This problem, referred to as contingent payment is out of the scope of this paper.
In case Bob receives a payment that is not correct or just fails to receive any payment from Alice, we propose to use a dispute mechanism coupled with a reputation system (again, out of scope of this paper) which could be a way to stop malicious senders. In such scenario, Bob could make a zero-knowledge proof that no ciphertext broadcast by Mxr matched the contract he had with Alice. In that case, Alice's reputation on the system could be severely damaged and may result in fewer users willing to transact with her.
Mxr users distinguishability. An important drawback of ZETH comes from the fact that users of Mxr are distinguishable. That is, it is feasible for an adversary to tell the difference between users using the mixer and those who do not, i.e. who have never used Addr or called the mixing contract. Hence, it is important to be aware that a party registering an address to Addr discloses that they perform transactions via ZETH or help other parties to do that.
However, the recipient of a ZETH payment can remain unrecognized as a user of the system as long as they transmitted their addr pk to the sender using off-chain communication; and as long as they do not manipulate the funds they control on the mixer. A party is identified as a user of ZETH as soon as they make a call to the mixer or any other ZETH smart contract. Leaking such information may be benign in some cases, but sometimes it may put the user at risk, e.g. if the user lives in a country ruled by an authoritarian regime that forbids using privacy-enhancing technologies.
Failures and backup. The design of ZETH presents some desirable properties related to hardware failure or loss of the zethNotes. In fact, provided that a user has a backup of their zethAddresses, they can easily retrieve the set of their zethNotes by scanning the chain in search for events emitted by the mixer contract. As described earlier, Mxr broadcast encrypted zethNotes, thus a user who downloads and tries to decrypt all emitted ciphertexts, eventually retrieves the set of all zethNotes they should control.
Forward secrecy. Using a single zethAddress for all incoming payments puts a user at risk. An adversary who retrieves user's decrypting key k sk at time t could expose all communications that happened prior to this time and thus violate forward secrecy. A way to mitigate this, would be to renew zethAddresses periodically to ensure that zethNotes are encrypted under different encryption keys over time.
The threat of a quantum attacker. Using encrypted broadcast implies storing ciphertexts on a publicly available chain. A direct consequence is that they are subject to quantum attacks, which violates the privacy promises of the protocol, unless the ciphertexts are encrypted using post-quantum secure encryption scheme.
ZETH for permissioned chains
In this section we detail a few properties of ZETH regarding its use in consortium and permissioned chains. We note that threat models between permissioned and public chains differ in many ways. For example, permissioned networks offer control over the parties that want to join, can efficiently counter Sybil attacks and if parties behave maliciously, they can be excluded from the chain and never allowed to join again.
CRS generation. As mentioned in Section 2.3, a trusted setup needs to be carried out once for the protocol to work. While delegating the generation of the CRS to a trusted party inside or outside the system could be acceptable in some circumstances, such trust assumptions are unacceptable in most cases.
In order to limit the trust put in the party in charge of generating the CRS, multi-party protocols could be considered. However, it is still required for the users of the system to believe that among all the parties that are involved in the CRS generation at least one is honest. In the other case, colluding parties could prove false statements and, effectively, create money "out of thin air".
By its very nature a public blockchain project is opened to everyone. As a consequence, the set of potential users of the system can theoretically contain all humans living on Earth. Although often all system users are welcomed to join multi-party CRS generation, practice shows that it is not usually the case. One example of this observation is the recent Sapling MPC implemented by Zcash. Despite the fact that the procedure was opened to everyone, only around 90 people 16 joined the MPC ceremony in order to generate the CRS. Furthermore, in a public blockchain there is no way of telling how many of these 90 people were in fact different, who they represent, or what are their incentives. That is, a dishonest user could simply generate and register multiple identities hoping for gaining unfair impact on the final shape of the generated CRS.
Nevertheless, in permissioned blockchains the situation is quite different and it is justified to assume that all the network members are known. Moreover, some requirements can be enforced to ensure that all parties involved in the network participate in the distributed trusted setup generation. For example, access to the network may only be granted to the parties who have participated in the CRS generation.
Furthermore, one can assume that the parties also do not want to pass on the CRS generation. This is since members of consortium chains are often actors that practice and evolve in very similar economic sectors. Hence, every member has an incentive to acquire information about the activity of the others. In fact, being able to gather intelligence about other members or being able to violate the soundness of the system could lead to a competitive advantage. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that all members of the network are incentivized to take part in the generation of the CRS, rather than just use the trusted setup provided by their competitors. As a consequence, it is justified to remove the threat of full collusion regarding the generation of the CRS from the threat model.
Privacy leakages. As mentioned, Ethereum addresses of parties using the mixer contract are revealed since they all need to pay gas to call the mixer's function. While such leakage might be problematic in public chains, this is not necessarily an issue in permissioned networks. In fact, it could be expected that the zethAddress of each network member is added to Addr as part of the pemissioning mechanism for instance.
A note on Sybil attacks and distinguishability. As noted in Section 4, a small number of registered players in Addr may allow an adversary to efficiently connect senders and recipients of payments. Furthermore, an adversary can fool honest parties to believe that there are enough parties in the mixer to provide necessary security, while that is not the case, cf. Section 4. Fortunately, in a permissioned blockchain Sybil attacks can efficiently be prevented, since joining the chain is not open to everyone and one can assume that each party therein is somehow verified (e.g. when the system remains compliant with the Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements). This property allows for more precise measurements of privacy level of the mixer. For example, given access to Addr one can credibly estimate the number of all involved parties and judge for themselves whether this number is satisfiable for them or not.
Implementation
In this section we describe the proposed proof of concept implementation of ZETH 17 . Our implementation relies on the libsnark 18 library and makes use of the precompiled contracts for the elliptic curve operations on bn256 introduced in Ethereum after the Byzantium hardfork. In order to implement ZETH, we follow the separation of concerns [Dij82] approach. Hence, the proposed architecture is modular and comports different components, each of which has its own role. The components communicate with each other using Remote Procedure Calls (RPC), which are implemented using the gRPC framework 19 along with Protocol Buffers 20 . The overall architecture of the proof of concept is presented in Fig. 4 . ...
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Proof generator (PG)
The core component of ZETH is Proof Generator (PG). This component holds a Rank 1 Constraint System (R1CS) representation for the circuit corresponding to relation R z21 , cf. Section 3.4.3, and presents an RPC interface to receive and answer requests from Proof Consumers (PC).
R1CS is an NP-complete relation of tuples ((A, B, C, v), w), where A, B, C are matrices and v, w are vectors over some finite field F. The relation is satisfied iff A (1, v, w) • B(1, v, w) = C(1, v, w) . A, B, C represent the circuit gates (left and right inputs, and an output), v and w are public and private inputs respectively [BGT + 18,GKV + 18]. This representation was prepared using the libsnark library.
In our PoC starting PG triggers the generation of a CRS for the zkSNARK for R z and results in proving and verification keys, denoted by crs P , crs V resp. The keys are stored on disk and the server starts waiting for incoming requests. As of now, the proposed RPC interface is limited to only two types of calls, i.e GetVerificationKey and GetProof. The first call reads the verification key crs V and sends it over to the caller. The second, GetProof, takes an input provided by PC, i.e. an assignment to the witness variables, generates the proof, and returns it to the caller.
To ease the use of ZETH, PG is run in a Docker container 22 listening on a given port. This container could be launched on a user's machine in the background as a daemon process waiting to receive requests to generate proofs. Since proof generation is computationally expensive, PG is written in C++ for the sake of efficiency.
Proof consumer (PC)
The proof consumer is a module responsible for requesting proofs to PG. This component gets the instance and its witness as input. It does not hold an R1CS representation for the statement or carry out any operation to generate the proofs (contrary to the proof generator). In fact, the PC does not even need to know the CRS required to prepare or verify the proof.
Since no expensive computation is expected to be carried out on PC, it is reasonable to use any high-level programming language without worrying too much about the performance overhead that can be introduced. In its current state, the proof of concept does not provide any command line interface (CLI) nor front-end to ease payments via Mxr and improve user experience. Development of applications to ease user experience is left as further work and improvements.
Separate CRS generator
It is important to highlight that centralizing the generation of the CRS in the component in charge of generating proofs comes with very high trust assumptions and could translate in a violation of the soundness of the system. More precisely, if PG generates the CRS, it knows the CRS's trapdoor what allows the production of fake, yet acceptable, proofs by running the simulator algorithm of the underlying zkSNARK. We emphasize here that the secure CRS generation is out of the scope of the presented proof of concept.
A natural improvement of our proof of concept would be to introduce a separate CRS Generator (CG) component in charge of generating and publishing the CRS. CG could either be a single trusted component or one of many components involved in an MPC ceremony that generates the CRS. Choosing the method to generate the CRS depends on the trust assumptions of the system. We recommend using an MPC ceremony.
Adding the CRS generator as a new component in the architecture comes with a few changes. First of all, new RPC interfaces need to be introduced in order to make other components able to fetch the proving and verification keys from CG. The interfaces are required, since PG needs to have access to crs P to be able to generate a proof. Likewise, the Vrf smart contract needs to have access to the verification key crs V to be able to run the verification routine of the underlying zkSNARK. Moreover, it should also be possible to require CG to publish the generated CRS (crs P , crs V ) to make it easily accessible to users of the system. While the CRS could be published on a web-page, it is necessary to keep in mind that the server storing and serving the CRS needs to be assumed non-malicious and always online, otherwise it could be possible to change the CRS and advertise a malicious one. To that end, keeping the generated CRS on-chain as part of a smart contract's storage is appealing. However, the size of the proving key is often too big for this solution to be considered. We let the implementation details of CG, along with the design changes it implies, as further work to the interested reader.
The mixer smart contract
While both PG and PC run on a user's machine, Mxr is a smart contract, and thus gets compiled down to an EVM bytecode and executed on-chain. This smart contract maintains the Merkle tree of commitments, the list of serial numbers that have been revealed as payments were made, and is in charge of calling the zkSNARK verification algorithm along with some additional checks to keep the system sound. We note that the zkSNARK used in the system is publicly verifiable and the verification is efficient enough to be carried out on-chain. The core function of Mxr is the Mix function described on Fig. 5. 
Paying with ZETH -flow of function calls
Given the main components of the proof of concept, this section describes the flow of function calls during a ZETH payment. The section follows and explains the steps described on Fig. 4. Step 0: A payment is triggered by a user of the system, who also specifies the recipient(s) and value(s). The selection of the notes to spend can either be detailed by the user, or managed by software. Steps 1 and 2: (1) Randomness is generated for the newly created zethNotes which are then encrypted using the recipients' encryption keys. (2) An RPC call is made to PG to generate a proof. The call passes a witness for the instance being proven. Steps 3 to 5: (3) The RPC call is executed and (4) the proof is generated from the given inputs. (5) The obtained proof is sent back to the client. Steps 6 and 7: (6) The proof is received and (7) used as an argument, along with the encrypted zethNotes, to the Mix function. Steps 8 to 11: (8) Mix is executed and the on-chain verification of the zk-SNARK proof is done via the Vrf contract. (9 -10) The contract leverages the precompiled contracts for elliptic curve operations on bn256 written in
else SerialNumberList.Insert(sni) endif 6 : endfor Step 12: The events triggered by the execution of Mix are emitted.
Step 13: The Receive function runs in the background on the client. It listens and tries to decrypt all emitted ciphertexts. If a decryption succeeds, a payment is received and the user interface is updated to reflect the reception of a payment.
6.2 Remarks 6.2.1 Deploying PG and PC The architecture described above uses different components communicating via RPC calls. Every component could easily be deployed on a separate machine without affecting the way ZETH works. However, the threat model associated with the presented proof of concept only considers the case where the proof generator and proof consumer run on trusted machines that are physically accessible, owned and controlled by the user, and that communicate via a secure channel. In the proposed PoC, the machine running PG is represented by a Docker container, whereas PC runs directly on the user's machine (i.e. not in a container). Both processes communicate using a virtual loopback interface. As a consequence, the traffic generated by the communicating processes PG and PC does not leave the user's machine. Hence why we consider this communication channel to be secure. Deploying each component on a different and potentially untrusted machine is facilitated by the modularity of the proposed architecture, and can easily be done with very few modifications to the code. Nevertheless, we emphasize that the threat model needs to be modified accordingly depending on where each component runs, who owns and controls the pieces of hardware running PG and PC, how data (keys, zethNotes) are managed and accessed, and so forth. It is highly probable that additional integrity and security checks would need to be implemented to keep the system secure.
Changing the programming languages
In the proposed proof of concept PG and PC communicate via RPC calls and are written in different programming languages. Since PG runs expensive operations related to the CRS generation and proof computation it is advised to implement it in a low level and efficient programming language. In the current PoC PG uses libsnark and is implemented in C++. Alternatively, one could implement PG in Rust using Bellman 23 , for instance. Making changes in one of the modules is completely transparent for the others. That is, changes in PG do not impact PC in any way, provided the API is not changed and the format of requests and responses is the same, and vice versa. Components are loosely coupled what makes the entire architecture more flexible.
Using ZETH with ERC20/ERC223 tokens
The pseudocode of the Mix function, cf. Fig. 5 , is compatible to work with ERC20 or ERC223 tokens. In fact, SendValue is a pseudocode function that represents the action of sending value from a contract to a recipient. (Here, the recipient of the funds is the sender of the transaction). In order to use the mixer with a given digital asset, one needs to use the SendValue function bound to that asset. Namely, if Ether is used, the solidity code for SendValue is msg.sender.transfer (amount). However, if Mxr is used to transfer ERC20 tokens, the solidity code for SendValue is erc20TokenInstance.transfer(msg.sender, amount).
In addition to properly instantiate SendValue, a few other minor changes need to be introduced in Mxr. In fact, the contract needs to be given the address of the ERC20 token to use and the right allowances need to be set for Mxr to be able to modify user balances on the token contract on their behalf.
Ethereum events to push data to consumers
In general, retrieving data from a database may cause data leakage and privacy issues. The sole fact that some user is querying a particular database may reveal private information. For example, in the case presented in this paper, a user who constantly queries the mixer contract could be identified as a receiver of a payment who wants to fetch their new notes. In particular, if an adversary observing the mixer notices that a payment made by some party P is followed by queries to Mxr by another party P , they may conclude that the payment was sent from P to P .
In order to prevent any data leakage associated with users' queries, we leverage Ethereum events to log important data and push ZETH-related pieces of information directly to each subscriber. This enables Mxr users to be aware of the current state of the contract without requiring them to query the blockchain and obfuscates the link between a sender and their recipients.
Multiple payments in a single transaction
The ability to emit multiple events in a single smart contract call makes it possible to perform multiple payments within a single transaction. In fact, Alice can pay both Bob and some other party Charlie by generating a zethNote for each of them, and then encrypting each note with their encryption keys. The call to Mix broadcasts both ciphertexts using Ethereum events. The recipients can retrieve their zethNotes by decrypting them. The upper bound for the number of parties that can be paid in a single transaction is given by the parameter M in the joinsplit equation (cf. Eq. (1)).
The possibility to do multiple payments in a single transaction leads to some hope regarding scalability of the proposed protocol as it could be used to limit the number of transactions submitted to the system. Unfortunately, increasing the number of input notes N significantly affects the performance of the system as checking multiple Merkle path efficiently remains a major bottleneck. Moreover, increasing M while keeping N small is not a viable solution. In fact, a large number of output notes M could lead to plethora of notes of negligible value. Making any payment with such scattered funds would require multiple transactions to gather them together. Further work is required in this direction.
Gas cost
The overall gas cost of a Mix call is dominated by the gas cost of a zkSNARK proof π verification. (For the details of the underlying zkSNARK Ψ used in the PoC check [BCTV13, Fig. 10, App. B] .) We express the verification cost as a function of the gas cost of key operations such as point addition (ECADD GAS), scalar multiplication (ECMUL GAS) and pairings equality checks (PAIRING BASE GAS for each equality to check and additionally PAIRING PER POINT GAS for each pairing to compute 24 .) on bn256. Let x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) denote the instance and {vk
represent the CRS elements all belonging to group G 1 or G 2 ; proof π consists of 8 elements: π A , π A , π B , π C , π C , π K , π H ∈ G 1 and π B ∈ G 2 . Similarly to [BCTV13] we define groups G 1 , G 2 , G T of size exponential to the security parameter λ and a bilinear pairing e : G 1 × G 2 → G T . We denote group's G i generator by g i and use additive notation for G 1 and G 2 , and multiplicative notation for G T . Operations performed by a verifier contract Vrf follows Ψ.V and come with the costs:
1. Compute the linear combination
gas cost: n · (ECMUL GAS + ECADD GAS) + ECADD GAS. 2. Check the validity of knowledge commitments:
e(π C , vk C ) = e(π C , g 2 ) , gas cost: 3 · (PAIRING BASE GAS + 2 · PAIRING PER POINT GAS). 3. Check that the same coefficients were used:
βγ , π B ) , gas cost: PAIRING BASE GAS+3·PAIRING PER POINT GAS+2·ECADD GAS. 4. Check QAP divisibility:
gas cost: PAIRING BASE GAS+3·PAIRING PER POINT GAS+ECADD GAS. 24 Note that the gas cost of the group operation in the target group of the bilinear pairing is included in PAIRING PER POINT GAS along with the computation of the bilinear pairing itself. Thus, it is not necessary to account for it separately in the gas cost computation.
Using the Ethereum parameters 25 and the fee schedule described in the Ethereum Yellow Paper [Woo18] , we can estimate the gas cost of an on-chain proof verification. The overall gas cost associated with the verification of [BCTV13] zkSNARK lies below 2 million gas when the joinsplit equation (cf. Eq. (1)) has 2 private inputs and 2 private outputs. It is worth mentioning that this cost is expected to diminish tremendously if EIP1108
26 gets accepted and implemented. Importantly, modifying the number of inputs and outputs supported by the joinsplit equation increases the size of the circuit which affects the proving time. In addition, a larger instance increases the verification time, the verification cost, and the number of modifications made in the Ethereum storage at each function call. While verifying the zkSNARK proof constitutes the main gas cost of the Mix function, it is important to remember that storing value on Ethereum is expensive as well. As a consequence, deploying a mixer contract maintaining a very deep Merkle tree will not come for free, as the entire set of leaves 27 needs to be kept in the storage of Mxr, along with all the serial numbers. Keeping this is mind is essential when modify the parameters of the system.
Further improvements
As explained above, the piece of software implemented to test ZETH on Ethereum is a proof of concept resulting from the adaptation of existing projects. We emphasize that tremendous work is needed to have an acceptable proving time and a secure implementation that could be considered as a production-ready piece of software. The Zcash team has done astounding work the past couple years and their Sapling network upgrade has led to a dramatic reduction of the complexity of their circuit, leading to significant optimizations and reduction in execution time. Similar work could be carried out to improve ZETH, but this is left as a future work.
Furthermore, the current RPC interface can easily be extended to meet users' needs. The use of gRPC and of Protocol Buffers makes it trivial to define new services and extend existing ones. Extending the RPC interface and facilitating user experience is out of the scope of this work and let as a future work to the interested reader.
Last but not least, further work around the use of a multi-party computation ceremony is required to lessen trust assumptions around the generation of the CRS.
A Beyond ETH 1.0
In the current version of Ethereum, Externally Owned Accounts (EOA) are secured via the use of ECDSA signature scheme [oST13] and a nonce mechanism. However, several proposals have been made to abstract these security mechanisms and allow for alternative protection systems. The end goal is to enable users of the network to define their own security model.
To do so, owners of EOA could provide their own transactions validation process, defining their own signature scheme and its verification code. That is, a transaction initiated by user's address A is signed by A's signature algorithm and verified using A's verification code. While the signature algorithm and the corresponding verification code can be picked arbitrarily by the owner of the account, the protocol should only allows verification procedures that could be executed succinctly enough to protect the system liveness. To that end, an upper bound of 50 000 gas for the verification function has been initially proposed in [But15] which has been increased to 200 000 in further proposals [But18c] or [But18b] .
Abstracting out the verification process of each transaction opens new possibilities for mixers (cf. [But18a] for the case of ring signature mixers). If we could define a verification function to verify a zkSNARK proof efficiently enough, we could enhance the protocol to enable calls to the Mix function from newly generated addresses, possibly stealth address with no funds, while ensuring that the miner would receive fees directly from the funds held on the mixer. For example in case of ZETH, if arbitrary verification codes were supported, a party P willing to execute Mxr.Mix could first create a stealth address P , and then submit a transaction tx to Mxr from P . Since nobody should be able to connect P and P , the anonymity of P would be protected 28 . Nevertheless, the design of account abstraction is still under discussion and several trade-offs need to be taken into consideration to allow for more abstraction while keeping the system sound and secure [But17] .
B Security guarantees
The security guarantees of our scheme are inherited directly from the building blocks we use, especially Zerocash. The Zerocash authors described three necessary conditions for a payment system DAP to be private and secure. That is, 1. ledger indistinguishability, 2. transaction non-malleability, and 3. balance.
We briefly remind these notions. However, since our ambition is not to build a new ledger, but a mixer that works on top of some existing blockchain we shall define these properties in regard to a smart contract. Thus, in the following we talk about (1) mixer indistinguishability, (2) mixer transaction non-malleability, and (3) mixer balance. We briefly introduce these notions and debate about their importance.
B.1 Mixer indistinguishability
This property ensures that a malicious user cannot acquire information, other than publicly known data, from the smart contract. Looking at the protocol presented in Section 3, public data could be, e.g., the account depositing money in the mixer, the amount deposited, the account transferring funds via the mixer, the account withdrawing funds along with the amount withdrawn. As mentioned, all these pieces of information are publicly accessible because users need to pay for the gas associated with the execution of these state transitions. Nevertheless, using ZETH obfuscates the transaction graph, cf. Fig. 2 , and pieces of information such as the recipients or the amount of a given transaction are hidden.
As in [BCG + 14], mixer indistinguishability is defined as a game between an adversary A and a challenger C. The challenger initiates two mixers Mxr 0 and Mxr 1 and tosses a coin b ←$ {0, 1}. Then it sets Mxr lef t = Mxr b and Mxr right = Mxr 1−b . A is given access to (Mxr lef t , Mxr right ) and is allowed to execute queries on both mixers. After querying the mixers, A has to guess whether b = 0 or b = 1.
Denote by ADDR a set of address key pairs, and by NOTE a set of zethNotes. With this in mind, we present below the set of queries that can be submitted by A to the challenger C 29 (we describe each query with the associated steps performed by the challenger): Q = (CreateAddress) -Compute addr pk , addr sk ; -ADDR ← ADDR ∪ {(addr pk , addr sk )} / / Note that ADDR differs from Addr since we also include addr sk in addition to addr pk ; -return addr pk . Q = (Mix, {cmAddr -Execute Mix(tx Mix ) and abort if it aborts.
-Run Receive for all addr pk in ADDR.
In order to play the game, the adversary submits the queries in pairs (Q, Q ). If A's query is Insert, then Q is executed on Mxr lef t and query Q is executed on Mxr right . In the case of other query types, C executes Q on Mxr 0 and executes Q on Mxr 1 . Both queries have to be publicly consistent, i.e. be of the same type and should share the public input 30 . For (a 0 , a 1 ) being the output of the submitted queries, C sends it back to A in the form of a tuple (a b , a 1−b ). At the end of the game, A needs to guess the value b initially chosen by C. 29 The queries structure comes from Zerocash with only minor modifications to make them compatible with our mixer. 30 We refer the reader to [BCG + 14] for a formal definition of publicly consistent queries. without changing the underlying plaintexts, since IND-CCA2 holds. Likewise, any change in the plaintext changes the statement for the zero-knowledge proof and requires to provide a new proof π . Since the zkSNARK used is simulation-extractable, any adversary who provides proof π for an instance x, such that a pair (x, π) has not been computed before, has to know a corresponding witness w.
B.3 Balance
The balance property ensures that no adversary A can make money "out of thin air". To capture this intuition, [BCG + 14] defines a game BAL in which A wins if they own or spend more funds that they have either deposited or received from other parties via Mxr. Following the notation in the above-mentioned games, we say that a smart contract is balanced if for every PPT adversary A and sufficiently large λ Adv bal A,BAL (λ) ≤ negl(λ) . At first a mixer Mxr is set up by a challenger C and A is given oracle access to it. A is free to issue queries to Mxr as in Appendix B.1. At the end of the game, A sends C a set of notes {z i } i∈I , for some set I. Challenger C computes the following quantities:
• v unspent : the total value of spendable notes in {z i } i∈I . We call a note z spendable if it is feasible to create a transaction tx Mix such that tx Mix uses z's data as input and is acceptable by Mxr.
• v publicIn : the total value of public input v in in transactions submitted by A.
• v publicOut : the total value of public output v out in transactions submitted by A.
• v inc : value of all notes transferred to A from addresses in ADDR.
• v exp : value of all notes transferred from A to addresses in ADDR.
Note that all values can be computed by C by observing A's queries to Mxr. We say that A wins the game BAL iff
